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Abstract
Inferences that arise from loss functions determined by the prior are
considered and it is shown that these lead to limiting Bayes rules that
are closely connected with likelihood. The procedures obtained via these
loss functions are invariant under reparameterizations and are Bayesian
unbiased or limits of Bayesian unbiased inferences. These inferences serve
as well-supported alternatives to MAP-based inferences.
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1 Introduction
Suppose we have a sampling model, given by a collection of densities {fθ :
θ ∈ Θ} with respect to a support measure µ on sample space X , and a proper
prior, given by density π with respect to support measure ν on Θ. When we
observe data x these ingredients lead to the posterior on Θ with density given
by π(θ |x) = π(θ)fθ(x)/m(x) with respect to support measure ν where m(x) =∫
Θ
π(θ)fθ(x) ν(dθ).
One can determine inferences based on these ingredients alone. For example,
suppose we are interested in a characteristic ψ = Ψ(θ) where Ψ : Θ → Ψ and
we let Ψ stand for both the space and mapping to conserve notation. The high-
est posterior density (hpd), or MAP-based, approach to determining inferences
constructs credible regions of the form
Hγ(x) = {ψ0 : πΨ(ψ0 |x) ≥ hγ(x)} (1)
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where πΨ(· |x) is the marginal posterior density with respect to a support
measure νΨ on Ψ, and hγ(x) is chosen so that hγ(x) = sup{k : ΠΨ({ψ :
πΨ(ψ |x) ≥ k} |x) ≥ γ}. It follows from (1) that, if we want to assess the
hypothesis H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0, then we can use the tail probability given by
1− inf{γ : ψ0 ∈ Hγ(x)}. Furthermore, the class of sets Hγ(x) is naturally ”cen-
tered” at the posterior mode (when it exists uniquely) as Hγ(x) converges to
this point as γ → 0. The use of the posterior mode as an estimator is commonly
referred to as MAP (maximum a posteriori) estimation. We can then think of
the size of the set Hγ(x), say for γ = 0.95, as a measure of how accurate the
MAP estimator is in a given context. Furthermore, we have that when Θ is an
open subset of a Euclidean space, then Hγ(x) minimizes volume among all γ-
credible regions. The use of MAP-based inferences is very common in machine
learning contexts, see, for example, Bishop (2006).
It is well-known, however, that hpd inferences suffer from a serious defect. In
particular, in the continuous case hpd inferences are not invariant under repa-
rameterizations. For example, this means that if ψMAP(x) is the MAP estimate
of ψ, then it is not necessarily true that Υ(ψMAP(x)) is the MAP estimate of
τ = Υ(ψ) when Υ is a 1-1, smooth transformation. The noninvariance of a sta-
tistical procedure seems very unnatural as it implies that the statistical analysis
depends on the parameterization and typically there does not seem to be a good
reason for this.
A class of inferences, similar to hpd inferences, avoids this lack of invariance.
These are referred to as relative surprise inferences and are based on the regions
Cγ(x) = {ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ cγ(x)} (2)
where πΨ is the marginal prior density with respect to a support measure νΨ on
Ψ, and cγ(x) = sup{k : ΠΨ({ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ k} |x) ≥ γ}. The hypothesis
H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0 is assessed by computing the tail probability
1− inf{γ : ψ0 ∈ Cγ(x)} = ΠΨ(πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≤ πΨ(ψ0 |x)/πΨ(ψ0) |x). (3)
We refer to πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) as the relative belief ratio of ψ as it measures how
beliefs in ψ being the true value change from a priori to a posteriori. The
relative surprise terminology then comes from (3) as this is measuring how
surprising the value ψ0 is by comparing its relative belief ratio to the relative
belief ratios of other values of ψ. The corresponding estimator is given by the
maximizer of the ratio πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ), which we refer to as the least relative
surprise estimator (LRSE), and denote as ψLRSE(x). Note that ψLRSE(x) is
the least surprising value as it maximizes (3). Beyond their invariance these
inferences have many optimality properties in the class of all Bayesian inferences
as documented in Evans (1997), Evans, Guttman and Swartz (2006), Evans and
Shakhatreh (2008) and Jang (2010). In this paper we will establish optimal
decision-theoretic properties for relative surprise inferences.
The idea of measuring surprise based on how beliefs change from a priori
to a posteriori and using this for inference, has arisen in other discussions. For
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example, see Baldi and Itti (2010) for the use and development of this idea in
the context of learning.
While hpd and relative surprise inferences may seem quite natural, an-
other ingredient is often added to the formulation of a statistical problem,
namely, a loss function. For this we have an action space Ψ, a function Ψ :
Θ → Ψ, such that Ψ(θ) is the correct action when θ is true, and a loss func-
tion L : Θ × Ψ → [0,∞) satisfying L(θ,Ψ(θ)) = 0, i.e., there is no loss
when we take the correct action. The goal of a statistical decision analy-
sis is then to find a decision function δ : X → Ψ that minimizes the prior
risk r(δ) =
∫
Θ
∫
X L(θ, δ(x))fθ(x)π(θ)µ(dx) ν(dθ) =
∫
X r(δ |x)m(x)µ(dx) where
r(δ |x) =
∫
Θ
L(θ, δ(x))π(θ |x) ν(dθ) is the posterior risk. Such a δ is called a
Bayes rule and clearly a δ that minimizes r(δ |x) for each x is a Bayes rule.
Further discussion of decision theory can be found in Berger (1985).
As noted in Bernardo (2005) a decision formulation also leads to credible
regions for ψ, namely, a γ-lowest posterior loss credible region is defined by
Lγ(x) = {ψ : r(ψ |x) ≤ lγ(x)} (4)
where lγ(x) = inf{k :
∫
{ψ0:r(ψ0 | x)≤k}
πΨ(ψ |x) νΨ(dψ) ≥ γ}. Note that ψ in (4)
is interpreted as the decision function that takes the value ψ constantly in x.
Clearly as γ → 0 the set Lγ(x) converges to the value of a Bayes rule at x.
For example, with quadratic loss the Bayes rule is given by the posterior mean
and a γ-lowest posterior loss region is the smallest sphere centered at the mean
containing at least γ of the posterior probability.
Typically, in the continuous context, Bayes rules will not be invariant un-
der reparameterizations. Robert (1996) recommended using the intrinsic loss
function based on a measure of distance between sampling distributions as
Bayes rules with respect to such losses are invariant. Bernardo (2005) rec-
ommended using the intrinsic loss function based on the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence KL(fθ, fθ′) between fθ and fθ′ . When ψ = θ the intrinsic loss function
is given by L(θ, θ′) = min(KL(fθ, fθ′),KL(fθ′, fθ)). For a general marginal pa-
rameter ψ the intrinsic loss function is defined by L(θ, ψ) = infθ′∈Ψ−1{ψ} L(θ, θ
′).
It can be shown, for example see Bernardo and Smith (2000) and Section
4, that hpd inferences arise as the limits of Bayes rules via a sequence of loss
functions given by
Lλ(θ, ψ) = I(Ψ(θ) 6∈ Bλ(ψ)) (5)
where λ > 0 and Bλ(Ψ(θ)) is the ball of radius λ centered at ψ. As previously
noted these inferences are not invariant under reparameterizations. It is our
purpose here to show that relative surprise inferences also arise via a sequence
of loss functions similar to (5) but based on the prior. So the loss functions are
also in a sense intrinsic but based on the prior and not the sampling model, as
with the intrinsic loss function.
In Section 2 we develop the prior-based loss function and show that ψLRSE
is a Bayes rule when Ψ is finite. In Sections 3 and 4 we extend this result to
show that ψLRSE is generally a limit of Bayes rules. In Section 5 we discuss
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prediction problems and in Section 6 show that relative surprise regions are
limits of γ-lowest posterior loss credible regions.
It is easy to see that the class of relative surprise credible regions {Cγ(x) :
γ ∈ [0, 1]} for ψ is independent of the marginal prior πΨ.We note, however, that
when we specify a γ ∈ [0, 1], the set Cγ(x) does depend on πΨ through cγ(x).
So the form of relative surprise inferences about ψ is completely robust to the
choice of πΨ but the quantification of the uncertainty in the inferences is not.
For example, when ψ = Ψ(θ) = θ, then θLRSE(x) is the MLE while, in general,
ψLRSE(x) is the maximizer of the integrated likelihood where we have integrated
out nuisance parameters via the conditional prior given ψ. Similarly, relative
surprise regions are likelihood regions in the case of the full parameter, and
integrated likelihood regions generally. As such, the results derived in this paper
establish that likelihood inferences are essentially Bayesian in character. We
note, however, that a relative belief ratio πΨ(ψ0 |x)/πΨ(ψ0), while proportional
to an integrated likelihood, has an interpretation as a change in belief and cannot
be multiplied by an arbitrary positive constant, as with a likelihood, without
losing this interpretation.
In Le Cam (1953) it is shown that the MLE is asymptotically Bayes but this
is for a fixed loss function, with increasing amounts of data and a sequence of
priors. In this paper the amount of data and the prior are fixed but we may
require a sequence of loss functions, to show that the MLE is a limit of Bayes
rules. Berger, Liseo and Wolpert (1999) discuss maximum integrated likelihood
estimates where default or noninformative priors are used to integrate out nui-
sance parameters and show good properties for this approach. Aitkin (2010)
develops an approach to assessing hypotheses using the posterior distribution
of likelihood ratios that is based on earlier work by Dempster (1973). As that
approach does not use integrated likelihoods and, as of this time, doesn’t have
a decision-theoretic formulation, it is quite different than what we discuss here.
2 Estimation from Prior-based Loss Functions:
The Finite Case
The following theorem presents the basic definition of the loss function when
Ψ is finite and establishes an important optimality result. For more general
situations we will need to modify this loss function slightly.
Theorem 1. Suppose that πΨ(ψ) > 0 for every ψ ∈ Ψ and that Ψ is finite with
νΨ equal to counting measure. Then for the loss function
L(θ, ψ) =
I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ)
πΨ(Ψ(θ))
(6)
a Bayes rule is given by ψLRSE.
Proof: We have that
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r(δ |x) =
∫
Θ
I(Ψ(θ) 6= δ(x))
πΨ(Ψ(θ))
π(θ |x) ν(dθ) =
∫
Ψ
I(ψ 6= δ(x))
πΨ(ψ)
πΨ(ψ |x) νΨ(dψ)
=
∫
Ψ
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
νΨ(dψ)−
πΨ(δ(x) |x)
πΨ(δ(x))
. (7)
Since Ψ is finite, the first term in (7) is finite and a Bayes rule at x is given by
the value δ(x) that maximizes the second term. Therefore, ψLRSE(x) is a Bayes
rule.
From (7) the prior risk of δ is
r(δ) = #(Ψ)− EM (πΨ(δ(x) |x)/πΨ(δ(x))) =
∑
ψ
Mψ(δ(x) 6= ψ) (8)
where EM denotes expectation with respect to the prior predictive and Mψ is
the probability measure on X obtained by averaging Pθ using the conditional
prior given that Ψ(θ) = ψ, namely, Mψ(A) =
∫
Ψ−1{ψ}
Pθ(A)Π(dθ |Ψ(θ) = ψ).
Therefore, finding a Bayes rule with respect to (6) is equivalent to finding δ
that maximizes EM (πΨ(δ(x) |x)/πΨ(δ(x))). So a Bayes rule maximizes the prior
expected relative belief ratio evaluated at the estimate and it is clear that the
LRSE is a Bayes rule as it maximizes the relative belief ratio for each x.
If instead we take the loss function to be I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ), then virtually the
same proof establishes that ψMAP is a Bayes rule. The prior risk for this loss
function and estimator δ can be written as∑
ψ
Mψ(δ(x) 6= ψ)πΨ(ψ) (9)
which is the prior probability of making an error. Both I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ) and (6)
are two-valued loss functions but, when we make an incorrect decision, the loss
is constant in Ψ(θ) for I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ) while it equals the reciprocal of the prior
probability of Ψ(θ) for (6). So (6) penalizes an incorrect decision much more
severely when the true value of Ψ(θ) is in the tails of the prior. This makes
sense as we would want to override the effect of the prior when the prior is not
placing appreciable mass at the true value. Note that ψMAP = ψLRSE when ΠΨ
is uniform.
As we have already noted πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) is proportional to the integrated
likelihood of ψ when we integrate the likelihood with respect to the conditional
prior of θ given ψ. So, under the conditions of Theorem 1, we have shown that
the maximum integrated likelihood estimator is a Bayes rule. Furthermore, the
Bayes rule is the same for every choice of πΨ and only depends on the full prior
through the conditional prior placed on the nuisance parameters. When ψ = θ
then ψLRSE(x) is the MLE of θ and so the MLE of θ is a Bayes rule for every
prior π.
We consider an application.
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Example 1. Classification
For a classification problem we have k categories {ψ1, . . . , ψk} prescribed by
some function Ψ, where πΨ(ψi) > 0 for each i. Based on observed data x we
want to classify the data as having come from one of the distributions in the
classes specified by Ψ−1{ψi}.
The standard Bayesian solution to this problem is to use ψMAP(x) as the
classifier. From (9) we have that ψMAP(x) minimizes the prior probability of
misclassification. Note that Mψ(δ(x) 6= ψ) is the prior probability of a mis-
classification given that ψ is the correct class and (9) is the weighted average
of these probabilities where the weights are given by the prior probabilities of
the ψ. We see from (8) that ψLRSE(x) is instead minimizing the sum over ψ of
the probabilities of misclassification given that ψ is the correct class. So the
essence of the difference between these two approaches in this problem is that
ψLRSE(x) treats the errors of misclassification equally while ψMAP(x) weights
them by their prior probabilities of occurrence.
We note that (8) is an upper bound on (9). So if the Bayes risk for loss
function (6) is small, the prior risk of ψLRSE(x), with respect to the loss function
I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ), is also small, i.e., when using ψLRSE(x) the overall prior probability
of a misclassification will also be small.
In general, it seems appropriate to be concerned with minimizing each of
the probabilities Mψ(δ(x) 6= ψ) and not downweight those corresponding to ψ
values that have small prior probability. As a specific simple example suppose
k = 2 and x ∼ Binomial(ψ1) or x ∼ Binomial(ψ2) with π(ψ1) = 1 − ǫ and
π(ψ2) = ǫ. After observing x we want to classify the observation. For example,
ψi could be the probability of a diagnostic test for a disease indicating that the
disease is present. We suppose that ψ1 is the probability of a positive diagnostic
test for the nondiseased population while ψ2 is this probability for the diseased
population. Further suppose that ψ1/ψ2 is very small, indicating that the test
is successful in identifying the disease while not yielding many false positives,
and suppose ǫ is very small, indicating that the disease is very rare. We have
that π(ψ1 | 1) = ψ1(1− ǫ)/(ψ1(1− ǫ)+ψ2ǫ) and π(ψ1 | 0) = (1−ψ1)(1− ǫ)/((1−
ψ1)(1 − ǫ) + (1 − ψ2)ǫ). Therefore, ψMAP(1) = ψ1 if ψ1/ψ2 > ǫ/(1 − ǫ) and
is ψ2 otherwise, while ψMAP(0) = ψ1 if (1 − ψ1)/(1 − ψ2) > ǫ/(1 − ǫ) and
is ψ2 otherwise. Also ψLRSE(1) = ψ1 if ψ1 > ψ2 and is ψ2 otherwise, while
ψLRSE(0) = ψ1 if (1 − ψ1) > (1− ψ2) and is ψ2 otherwise. So we see from this
that ψMAP will always classify a person to the nondiseased population when ǫ
is small enough, e.g., take ψ1 = 0.05, ψ2 = 0.80, and ǫ < 0.0566. By contrast,
in this situation, ψLRSE will always classify an individual with a positive test
to the diseased population and to the nondiseased population for a negative
test. Now Mψi is the Binomial(ψi) distribution, so when ψ1 < ψ2 and ǫ is small
enough
Mψ1(ψMAP 6= ψ1) +Mψ2(ψMAP 6= ψ2) = 0 + 1 = 1,
Mψ1(ψLRSE 6= ψ1) +Mψ2(ψLRSE 6= ψ2) = ψ1 + (1− ψ2) < 1.
This illustrates clearly the difference between these two procedures as ψLRSE
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does vastly better than ψMAP on the diseased population when ψ1 is small and
ψ2 is large as would be the case for a good diagnostic. Of course ψMAP minimizes
the overall error rate but at the price of ignoring the most important class in
this problem. Note that this example can be extended to the situation where
we need to estimate the ψi based on samples from the respective populations
but this will not materially affect the overall conclusions. Also see Example 3
where ǫ is considered unknown.
In a general estimation problem an estimator δ is unbiased with respect to
a loss function L if Eθ(L(θ
′, δ(x))) ≥ Eθ(L(θ, δ(x))) for all θ
′, θ ∈ Θ. This says
that on average δ(x) is closer to the true value than any other value when we
interpret L(θ, δ(x)) as a measure of distance between the estimate and what is
being estimated. A reasonable definition of Bayesian unbiasedness for δ with
respect to L is thus obtained by requiring that∫
Θ
∫
Θ
Eθ(L(θ
′, δ(x)))Π(dθ)Π(dθ′) ≥
∫
Θ
Eθ(L(θ, δ(x)))Π(dθ) = r(δ).
Here we are thinking of θ′ as a false value generated from the prior independently
of the true value θ so θ′ has no connection with the data. Therefore, δ is Bayesian
unbiased if on average δ(x) is closer to the true value than a false value. In
Section 3 we prove that ψLRSE is Bayesian unbiased with respect to a general
class of loss functions that includes both (6) and I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ).
3 Estimation from Prior-based Loss Functions:
The Countably Infinite Case
The loss function (6) does not provide meaningful results when Ψ is infinite as
(8) shows that r(δ) will be infinite. So we modify (6) via a parameter η > 0
and define the loss function
Lη(θ, ψ) =
I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ)
max(η, πΨ(Ψ(θ)))
(10)
and note that Lη is a bounded function of (θ, ψ). This loss function is like (6)
but does not allow for arbitrarily large losses. Without loss of generality we can
restrict η to a sequence of values converging to 0. We prove the following result
in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Suppose that πΨ(ψ) > 0 for every ψ ∈ Ψ, that Ψ is countable
with νΨ equal to counting measure and that ψLRSE(x) is the unique maximizer
of πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) for all x. For the loss function (10) and Bayes rule δη, then
δη(x)→ ψLRSE(x) as η → 0, for every x ∈ X .
The proof of Theorem also establishes the following result.
Corollary 3. For all sufficiently small η the value of the Bayes rule at x is
given by ψLRSE(x).
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If instead we take the loss function to be I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ), then virtually the same
proof as in Theorem 1 establishes that ψMAP is a Bayes rule.
We now investigate the unbiasedness of ψLRSE(x). For this we consider loss
functions of the form
L(θ, ψ) = I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ)h(Ψ(θ)) (11)
for some nonnegative function h which satisfies
∫
Θ h(Ψ(θ))Π(dθ) < ∞. This
class of loss functions includes (6) when Ψ is finite, (10) and I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ). We
have the following result.
Theorem 4. If Ψ is countable, then ψLRSE(x) is Bayesian unbiased under the
loss function (11).
Proof: The prior risk of δ is given by
r(δ) =
∫
Θ
∫
X
L(θ, δ(x))Pθ(dx)Π(dθ)
=
∫
Θ
∫
X
[h(Ψ(θ))− I(Ψ(θ) = δ(x))h(Ψ(θ))]Pθ(dx)Π(dθ)
=
∫
Θ
h(Ψ(θ))Π(dθ) −
∫
X
∫
Θ
I(Ψ(θ) = δ(x))h(Ψ(θ))Π(dθ |x)M(dx)
=
∫
Θ
h(Ψ(θ))Π(dθ) −
∫
X
h(δ(x))πΨ(δ(x) |x)M(dx)
and ∫
Θ
∫
Θ
∫
X
L(θ′, δ(x))Pθ(dx)Π(dθ)Π(dθ
′)
=
∫
Θ
∫
Θ
∫
X
[h(Ψ(θ′))− I(Ψ(θ′) = δ(x))h(Ψ(θ′))]Pθ(dx)Π(dθ)Π(dθ
′)
=
∫
Θ
h(Ψ(θ))Π(dθ) −
∫
X
h(δ(x))πΨ(δ(x))M(dx).
Therefore, δ is Bayesian unbiased if and only if∫
X
h(δ(x))[πΨ(δ(x) |x) − πΨ(δ(x))]M(dx) ≥ 0. (12)
It is a consequence of results proved in Evans and Shakhatreh (2008) that it is
always true that πΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)/πΨ(ψLRSE(x)) ≥ 1 and this establishes the
result. This can also be seen by noting that πΨ(· |x)/πΨ(·) is the density of
ΠΨ(· |x) with respect to ΠΨ and so we must have that the maximum of this
density is greater than or equal to 1.
The proof gives a sufficient condition for Bayesian unbiasedness with respect to
the loss (11).
Corollary 5. δ is Bayesian unbiased if πΨ(δ(x) |x) ≥ πΨ(δ(x)) for all x.
At this point we have neither a proof of the Bayesian unbiasedness of ψMAP
with respect to I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ), nor a counterexample although we suspect that
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it is not. We do know, however, that ψMAP is Bayesian unbiased with respect
to I(Ψ(θ) 6= ψ) whenever ΠΨ is uniform because in that case ψMAP = ψLRSE.
It is also clear from (11) that ψLRSE possesses a very strong property as the
integrand is always nonnegative when δ = ψLRSE. In light of this we refer to an
estimator possessing this property as being uniformly (in x) Bayesian unbiased.
4 Estimation from Prior-based Loss Functions:
The Continuous Case
When ψ has a continuous prior distribution the argument in Theorem 2 does
not work as ΠΨ({δ(x)} |x) = 0. There are several possible ways to proceed
here but we consider a discretization of the problem that uses Theorem 2. For
this we will assume that the spaces involved are locally Euclidean, mappings
are sufficiently smooth and take the support measures to be the analogs of
Euclidean volume on the respective spaces. Further details on the mathematical
requirements underlying these assumptions can be found in Tjur (1974) where
spaces are taken to be Riemann manifolds. While the argument we provide
applies quite generally, we simplify this here by taking all spaces to be open
subsets of Euclidean spaces and the support measures to be Euclidean volume
on these sets.
For each λ > 0 we discretize the set Ψ via a countable partition {Bλ(ψ) :
ψ ∈ Ψ} where ψ ∈ Bλ(ψ),ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) > 0, supψ∈Ψdiam(Bλ(ψ))→ 0 as λ→ 0.
For example, the Bλ(ψ) could be equal volume rectangles in R
k. Further, we
assume that ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ))/νΨ(Bλ(ψ)) → πΨ(ψ) as λ → 0 for every ψ. This will
hold whenever πΨ is continuous everywhere and Bλ(ψ) converges nicely to {ψ}
as λ→ 0 (see Rudin (1974), Chapter 8 for the definition of ‘converges nicely’).
Let ψλ(ψ) ∈ Bλ(ψ) be such that ψλ(ψ
′) = ψλ(ψ) whenever ψ
′ ∈ Bλ(ψ) and
Ψλ = {ψλ(ψ) : ψλ(ψ) ∈ Bλ(ψ)} be the discretized version of Ψ. Note that one
point is chosen in each Bλ(ψ). We will call this a regular discretization of Ψ.
The discretized prior on Ψλ is πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψ)) = ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) and the discretized
posterior is πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψ) |x) = ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x).
We define the loss function for the discretized problem just as for Theorem
2, by
Lλ,η(θ, ψλ(ψ)) =
I(ψλ(Ψ(θ)) 6= ψλ(ψ))
max(η, πΨ,λ(ψλ(Ψ(θ))))
(13)
and denote a Bayes rule for this problem by δλ,η(x). In this case we not only
need that ψLRSE(x) is the unique maximizer of πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ), but we cannot
allow πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) to come arbitrarily close to its maximum outside a neigh-
borhood of ψLRSE(x). It is clear that when this does not hold then we are in a
pathological situation that will not apply in a typical application. The following
result is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 6. Suppose that πΨ is positive and continuous and we have a regular
discretization of Ψ. Further suppose that ψLRSE(x) is the unique maximizer of
πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) and for any ǫ > 0
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sup
{ψ:||ψ−ψLRSE(x)||≥ǫ}
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
<
πΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)
πΨ(ψLRSE(x))
.
Then, there exists η(λ) > 0 such that a Bayes rule δλ,η(λ)(x) converges to
ψLRSE(x) as λ→ 0 for all x.
Theorem 6 says that ψLRSE is a limit of Bayes rules. So when Ψ(θ) = θ we
have the result that the MLE is a limit of Bayes rules and more generally the
maximum integrated likelihood estimator is a limit of Bayes rules.
Now let ψˆλ(x) be the LRSE of the discretized problem, i.e., ψˆλ(x) maximizes
ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x)/ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) as a function of ψ ∈ Ψλ. The following result is
proved in the Appendix.
Corollary 7. ψˆλ converges to ψLRSE as λ→ 0.
Note that by Theorem 4, ψˆλ is uniformly Bayesian unbiased for the discretized
problem. Therefore, ψLRSE is the limit of uniformly Bayesian unbiased estima-
tors.
By similar arguments we can establish an analog of Theorem 6 for ψMAP
using the loss function given by (5). Actually in this case a simpler develop-
ment can be followed in certain situations. For this note that the posterior risk
of δ is given by 1 − ΠΨ(Bλ(δ(x)) |x) = 1 − πΨ(δ
′(x) |x)νΨ(Bλ(δ(x))) for some
δ′(x) ∈ Bλ(δ(x)). Now suppose we takeBλ(ψ) to be a sphere of radius λ centered
at ψ. Suppose further that for each ǫ > 0 there exists a λ(ǫ) > 0 such that when
||ψ − ψMAP(x)|| > λ(ǫ) then πΨ(ψ |x) < infψ′∈Bλ(ǫ)(ψMAP(x)) πΨ(ψ
′ |x). Since
νΨ(Bλ(ψ)) is constant we have that a Bayes rule δλ must then satisfy ||δλ(x)−
ψMAP(x)|| < ǫ. So we have proved that ψMAP is a limit of Bayes rules. By con-
trast, for the loss function I(Ψ(θ) 6∈ B
λ
(ψ))/ΠΨ(Bλ(Ψ(θ))) the posterior risk of
δ is given by
∫
Ψ
{ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ))}
−1ΠΨ(dψ |x)−
∫
Bλ(δ(x))
{ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ))}
−1ΠΨ(dψ |x).
The simpler approach is not available in this case because the first term is un-
bounded.
We consider now an important example.
Example 2. Regression (estimation)
Suppose that we have y = Xβ + e where y ∈ Rn, X ∈ Rn×k is fixed,
β ∈ Rn×k, and e ∼ Nn(0, σ
2I). We will assume that σ2 is known to simplify
the discussion. Let π be a prior density for β. Then having observed (X, y),
βLRSE(x) = b = (X
′X)−1X ′y which is the MLE of β. It is interesting to contrast
this result with what might be considered more standard Bayesian estimates
such as the posterior mode or posterior mean. For example, suppose that β ∼
Nk(0, τ
2I). Then the posterior distribution of β is Nk(µpost(β),Σpost(β)) where
µpost(β) = Σpost(β)σ
−2X ′Xb, Σpost(β) = (τ
−2I + σ−2X ′X)−1
and the posterior mean and modal estimates of β are both equal to µpost(β).
Writing the spectral decomposition of X ′X as X ′X = QΛQ′ we have that
||µpost(β)|| = ||(I + (σ
2/τ2)Λ−1)−1Q′b||.
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Since ||b|| = ||Q′b|| and 1/(1 + σ2/(τ2λi)) < 1 for each i, we see that µpost(β)
moves the MLE towards the prior mean 0. This is often cited as a positive
attribute of these estimates but consider the situation where the true value of β
lies in the tails of the prior. In that case it is certainly wrong to move β towards
the prior mean. When τ2 is chosen very large, so we avoid the possibility that
the true value of β lies in the tails of the prior, then the MLE and the posterior
mean are virtually the same. It makes sense to choose τ2 > σ2 as this says we
have less prior information about a βi than the amount we learn about β from
a single observation. So it is not clear that shrinking the MLE is necessarily a
good thing particularly as this requires giving up invariance.
Suppose now we want to estimate ψ = w′β for some setting w of the predic-
tors. The prior distribution of ψ is N(0, σ2prior(ψ)) = N(0, τ
2w′w) and the
posterior distribution is N(µpost(ψ), σ
2
post(ψ)) = N(w
′µpost(β), x
′Σpost(β)x).
Note that σ2prior(ψ) − σ
2
post(ψ) = w
′(τ2I − Σpost(β))w = τ
2w′Q′(I − (I +
(τ2/σ2)Λ)−1)Qw > 0 and so maximizing the ratio of the posterior to prior
densities leads to
ψLRSE(y) = (1− σ
2
post(ψ)/σ
2
prior(ψ))
−1µpost(ψ). (14)
Since σ2prior(ψ) > σ
2
post(ψ) we have |ψLRSE(y)| > |µpost(ψ)| and µpost(ψ) =
ψMAP(y). Note that when σ
2
post(ψ) is much smaller than σ
2
prior(ψ), in other
words the posterior is densely concentrated about µpost(ψ), then wLRSE(y) and
wMAP(y) are very similar. In general ψLRSE(y) is not equal to w
′b, the plug-in
MLE of ψ, although ψLRSE(y)→ w
′b as τ2 →∞.
5 Prediction from Prior-based Loss Functions
Suppose after observing x we want to predict a future value y ∈ Y where
y has model given by gη(θ)(y |x) with respect to support measure µY on Y.
We allow for the possibility here that the distribution of y depends on x and
also that θ may not index these distributions. Then we have that the joint
density of (θ, x, y) is given by π(θ)fθ(x)gη(θ)(y |x) and after observing x the
conditional density of y is given by the posterior predictive density q(y |x) =∫
Θ π(θ |x)gη(θ)(y |x) ν(dθ) while the prior predictive density of y is given by
q(y) =
∫
Θ
∫
X
π(θ)fθ(x)gη(θ)(y |x)µ(dx) ν(dθ). Therefore, the relative belief in a
future value y is given by q(y |x)/q(y) and we denote the maximizer of this by
yLRSE(x).
Again the LRSE arises from loss function considerations. For example, when
Y is finite we consider the loss function
L(y, y′) =
I(y 6= y′)
q(y)
,
where we think of y as some true value of y that is concealed from us by the
future, or some other mechanism, and which we want to predict. Then the
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posterior risk of a predictor δ : X → Y is given by
r(δ |x) =
∫
Y
q(y |x)
q(y)
µY(dy)−
q(δ(x) |x)
q(δ(x))
and we see that yLRSE is a Bayes rule. Also, the prior risk of predictor δ is given
by r(δ) =
∑
yMy(δ(x) 6= y) where My is the conditional prior predictive of x
given y and so r(δ) is the sum of the conditional prediction errors given y. We
can also develop results similar to Theorems 2 and 6 for the situation where Y
is not finite to show that yLRSE is a limit of Bayes rules.
We consider some examples.
Example 3. Classification (prediction)
Consider now a situation where (x, c) is such that x | c ∼ fc with c ∼
Bernoulli(ǫ) where f0 and f1 are known (or accurately estimated based on large
samples) but ǫ is unknown with prior π. This is a generalization of Example 1
where ǫ was assumed to be known. Then based on a sample (x1, c1), . . . , (xn, cn)
from the joint distribution we want to predict the value cn+1 for a newly observed
xn+1. Therefore, q(c) =
∫ 1
0
(1 − ǫ)1−cǫcπ(ǫ) dǫ and, if ǫ ∼ Beta(α, β), the prior
predictive of cn+1 is Bernoulli(α/(α+β)). For cn+1 the posterior predictive den-
sity is q(c | (x1, c1), . . . , (xn, cn), xn+1) ∝ (f0(xn+1))
1−c(f1(xn+1))
c
∫ 1
0 ǫ
nc¯+c(1−
ǫ)n(1−c¯)+(1−c)π(ǫ) dǫ with c¯ = n−1
∑n
i=1
ci. With a Beta(α, β) prior for ǫ, we have that q(c | (x1, c1), . . . , (x1, c1), xn+1)
∝ fc(xn+1)Γ (α+ nc¯+ c) Γ(β +n(1− c¯) + 1− c). From this we see immediately
that
cMAP =
{
1 if f1(xn+1)f0(xn+1)
(α+nc¯)
(β+n(1−c¯)) ≥ 1
0 otherwise,
cLRSE =
{
1 if f1(xn+1)f0(xn+1)
β(α+nc¯)
α(β+n(1−c¯)) ≥ 1
0 otherwise.
(15)
Note that cMAP and cLRSE are identical whenever α = β.
We can see from these formulas that a substantial difference will arise be-
tween cMAP and cLRSE when one of α or β is much bigger than the other. As in
Example 1 these correspond to situations where we believe that ǫ or 1−ǫ is very
small. Suppose we take α = 1 and let β be relatively large, as this corresponds
to knowing a priori that ǫ is very small. Then (15) implies that cMAP ≤ cLRSE
and so cLRSE = 1 whenever cMAP = 1. A similar conclusion arises when we take
β = 1 and α < 1.
To see what kind of improvement is possible we consider a simulation. Here
we take f0 to be a N(0, 1) density, f1 to be a N(µ, 1) density, let n = 10 and the
prior on ǫ be Beta(1, β). Table 1 presents the Bayes risks for cMAP and cLRSE
for various choices of β when µ = 1. When β = 1 they are equivalent but we
see that as β rises the performance of cMAP deteriorates while cLRSE improves.
Large values of β correspond to having information that ǫ is small. When β = 14
about 0.50 of the prior probability is to the left of 0.05, with β = 32 about 0.80
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β M0(cMAP 6= 0) +M1(cMAP 6= 1) M0(cLRSE 6= 0) +M1(cLRSE 6= 1)
1 0.386 + 0.390 = 0.776 0.386 + 0.390 = 0.776
14 0.002 + 0.975 = 0.977 0.285 + 0.380 = 0.665
32 0.000 + 0.997 = 0.997 0.292 + 0.349 = 0.641
100 0.000 + 1.000 = 1.000 0.300 + 0.324 = 0.624
Table 1: Conditional prior probabilities of misclassification for MAP and LRSE
for various values of β in Example 3 when α = 1, µ = 1, and n=10.
of the prior probability is to the left of 0.05, and with β = 100 about 0.99 of the
prior probability is to the left of 0.05. We see that the misclassification rates
for the small group (c = 1) stay about the same for cLRSE as β increases while
they deteriorate markedly for cMAP as the MAP procedure basically ignores the
small group.
We also investigated other choices for n and µ. There is very little change
as n increases. When µ moves towards 0 the error rates go up and go down as
µ moves away from 0, as one would expect. Of course, cLRSE always dominates
cMAP.
Example 4. Regression (prediction)
Consider the situation of Example 2 and suppose we want to predict a
response z at the predictor value w ∈ Rk. When β ∼ Nk(0, τ
2I) the prior
distribution of z is z ∼ N(0, σ2 + τ2w′w) = N(0, σ2prior(z)) and the posterior
distribution is N(µpost(z), σ
2
post(z)) where
µpost(z) = w
′µpost(β), σ
2
post(z) = σ
2 + w′Σpost(β)w.
To obtain zLRSE(y) we need to maximize the ratio of the posterior to the prior
density of z and an easy calculation shows that this leads to
zLRSE(y) = (1 − σ
2
post(z)/σ
2
prior(z))
−1µpost(z). (16)
Note that σ2prior(z)− σ
2
post(z) = σ
2
prior(w
′β)− σ2post(w
′β) > 0 and so |zLRSE(y)|
> |µpost(z)| and the LRSE is further from the prior mean than zMAP(y) =
µpost(z). Also, we see that, when σ
2
post(z) is small then zLRSE(y) and zMAP(y)
are very similar. Finally, comparing (14) and (16) we have that
zLRSE(y) = (σ
2
prior(z)/σ
2
post(ψ))w
′ψLRSE(y) = (1 + σ
2/τ2)ψLRSE(y)
and so the LRSE predictor at x is more dispersed than the LRSE estimator of
the mean at w and this makes good sense as we have to take into account the
additional variation due to prediction. By contrast wMAP(y) = ψMAP(y).
6 Regions from Prior-based Loss Functions
We now consider the lowest posterior loss γ-credible regions that arise from the
prior-based loss functions we have considered. Let Cγ(x) denote a γ-relative
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surprise region for ψ. Consider first the case where Ψ is finite. We have the
following result.
Theorem 8. Suppose that πΨ(ψ) > 0 for every ψ ∈ Ψ and that Ψ is finite with
νΨ equal to counting measure. Then for the loss function given by (6), Cγ(x)
is a γ-lowest posterior loss credible region.
Proof: From (4) and (7) the γ-lowest posterior loss credible region is
Lγ(x) =
{
ψ :
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
≥
∫
Ψ
πΨ(ζ |x)
πΨ(ζ)
νΨ(dζ) − lγ(x)
}
and lγ(x) = inf{k : ΠΨ({ψ : r(ψ |x) ≤ k} ≥ γ}. As
∫
Ψ(πΨ(z |x)/πΨ(z))νΨ(dz)
is independent of ψ it is clearly equivalent to define this region via Cγ(x) =
{ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ cγ(x)} , namely, Lγ(x) = Cγ(x).
Now consider the case where Ψ is countable and we use loss function (10).
Following the proof of Theorem 8 we see that a γ-lowest posterior loss region
takes the form
Lη,γ(x) = {ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/max(η, πΨ(ψ)) ≥ lη,γ(x)}
where lη,γ(x) = sup{k : ΠΨ({ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/max(η, πΨ(ψ)) ≥ k} ≥ γ}.We prove
the following result in the Appendix.
Theorem 9. Suppose that πΨ(ψ) > 0 for every ψ ∈ Ψ, that Ψ is countable
with νΨ equal to counting measure. For the loss function (10), we have that
Cγ(x) ⊂ lim infη→0 Lη,γ(x) whenever γ is such that ΠΨ(Cγ(x) |x) = γ and
lim supη→0 Lη,γ(x) ⊂ Cγ′(x) whenever γ
′ > γ and ΠΨ(Cγ′(x) |x) = γ
′.
While Theorem 9 does not establish the exact convergence limη→0 Lη,γ(x) =
Cγ(x) we suspect, however, that this does hold under quite general circum-
stances due to the discreteness. Theorem 9 does show that limit points of the
class of sets Lη,γ(x) always contain Cγ(x) and their posterior probability con-
tent differs from γ by at most γ′ − γ where γ′ > γ is the next largest value for
which we have exact content.
We now consider the continuous case and suppose we have a regular dis-
cretization. For S∗ ⊂ Ψλ = {ψλ(ψ) : ψλ(ψ) ∈ Bλ(ψ)}, namely, S
∗ is a subset
of a discretized version of Ψ, we define the undiscretized version of S∗ to be
S = ∪ψ∈S∗Bλ(ψ). Now let C
∗
λ,γ(x) be the γ-relative surprise region for the dis-
cretized problem and let Cλ,γ(x) be its undiscretized version. Note that in a
continuous context we will consider two sets as equal if they differ only by a set
of measure 0 with respect to ΠΨ. In the Appendix we prove the following which
says that a γ-relative surprise region for the discretized problem (after undis-
cretizing) converges to the γ-relative surprise region for the original problem.
Theorem 10. Suppose that πΨ is positive and continuous, we have a regular
discretization of Ψ and πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) has a continuous posterior distribution.
Then limλ→0 Cλ,γ(x) = Cγ(x).
While Theorem 10 has interest in its own right, we can use it to prove that
relative surprise regions are limits of lowest posterior loss regions.
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Let L∗η,λ,γ(x) be the γ-lowest posterior loss region obtained for the discretized
problem using loss function (13) and let Lη,λ,γ(x) be the undiscretized version.
We prove the following result in the Appendix.
Theorem 11. Suppose that πΨ is positive and continuous, we have a regular
discretization of Ψ and πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) has a continuous posterior distribution.
Then Cγ(x) = lim
λ→0
lim inf
η→0
Lη,λ,γ(x) = lim
λ→0
lim sup
η→0
Lη,λ,γ(x).
In Evans, Guttman, and Swartz (2006) and Evans and Shakhatreh (2008) ad-
ditional properties of relative surprise regions are developed. For example, it is
proved that a γ-relative surprise region Cγ(x) for ψ satisfying ΠΨ(Cγ(x) |x) = γ
minimizes ΠΨ(B) among all (measurable) subsets of Ψ satisfying ΠΨ(B |x) ≥ γ.
So a γ-relative surprise region is smallest among all γ-credible regions for ψ
where size is measured using the prior measure. This property has several con-
sequences. For example, the prior probability that a region B(x) ⊂ Ψ contains
a false value from the prior is given by
∫
Θ
∫
Ψ
Pθ(ψ ∈ B(x))ΠΨ(dψ)Π(dθ) where
a false value is a value of ψ ∼ ΠΨ generated independently of (θ, x) ∼ ΠΨ×Pθ.
It can be proved that a γ-relative surprise region minimizes this probability
among all γ-credible regions for ψ and is always unbiased in the sense that the
probability of covering a false value is bounded above by γ. Furthermore, a γ-
relative surprise region maximizes the relative belief ratio ΠΨ(B |x)/ΠΨ(B) and
the Bayes factor ΠΨ(B |x)ΠΨ(B
c)/ΠΨ(B
c |x)ΠΨ(B) among all regions B ⊂ Ψ
with ΠΨ(B) = ΠΨ(Cγ(x) |x).
While the results in this section have been concerned with obtaining credible
regions for parameters, similar results can be proved for the construction of
prediction regions.
7 Conclusions
Relative surprise inferences are closely related to likelihood inferences. This to-
gether with their invariance and optimality properties make these prime candi-
dates as appropriate inferences in Bayesian contexts. This paper has shown that
relative surprise inferences arise naturally in a decision-theoretic formulation us-
ing loss functions based on the prior. As of yet these inferences are not typically
used while MAP-based inferences, which seem to possess few strong properties,
are commonly recommended. Based on the properties we have discussed in
this paper we conclude that improvements in inferences can be accomplished
by adopting relative surprise inferences. While we have required proper priors
in this paper, limiting relative surprise inferences, as priors become increasingly
diffuse, can also be obtained and have been discussed in the references.
Relative surprise estimation of the parameter ψ is based on the relative
belief ratio πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ). As this ratio is independent of the choice of πΨ,
estimation of ψ is to a certain extent robust to the choice of prior. The role of
the marginal prior πΨ arises in quantifying the uncertainty about the estimate
of ψ through the regions Cγ . So the conditional prior given ψ, together with
the model and data, are used to determine the form of any inferences about ψ,
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while the marginal prior for ψ, together with the model and data, are used to
quantify the uncertainty in these inferences.
By contrast predictions are based on the relative belief ratio q(y |x)/q(y)
which is generally dependent on the full prior π. So in a sense predictions are
less robust to the prior than estimation. On the other hand Bayesian inferences
are often advocated due to the regularizing effect of the prior. While the rela-
tive surprise approach does not fully incorporate such an effect for parameter
estimates, the full effect is available for prediction.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: We have that
rη(δ |x) =
∫
Ψ
I(ψ 6= δ(x))
max(η, πΨ(ψ))
πΨ(ψ |x) νΨ(dψ)
=
∫
Ψ
πΨ(ψ |x)
max(η, πΨ(ψ))
νΨ(dψ)−
πΨ(δ(x) |x)
max(η, πΨ(δ(x)))
. (17)
The first term in (17) is constant in δ(x) and bounded above by 1/η, so the
value of a Bayes rule at x is obtained by finding δ(x) that maximizes the second
term.
Consider η as fixed and note that
πΨ(δ(x) |x)
max(η, πΨ(δ(x)))
=
{
πΨ(δ(x) | x)
η if η > πΨ(δ(x))
πΨ(δ(x) | x)
πΨ(δ(x))
if η ≤ πΨ(δ(x)).
(18)
There are at most finitely many values of ψ satisfying η ≤ πΨ(ψ) and so
πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) assumes a maximum on this set, say at ψη(x). There are
infinitely many values of ψ satisfying η > πΨ(ψ) but clearly we can find η
′ < η
so that {ψ : η′ < πΨ(ψ) < η} is nonempty and finite. Thus, πΨ(ψ |x) assumes
its maximum on the set {ψ : πΨ(ψ) < η} in the subset {ψ : η
′ < πΨ(ψ) < η},
say at ψ′η(x). Therefore, a Bayes rule δη(x) is given by δη(x) = ψη(x) when
πΨ(ψη(x) |x)/πΨ(ψη(x)) ≥ πΨ(ψ
′
η(x) |x)/η and δη(x) = ψ
′
η(x) otherwise.
If η > πΨ(δ(x)), then
πΨ(δ(x) |x)/η < πΨ(δ(x) |x)/πΨ(δ(x)) ≤ πΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)/πΨ(ψLRSE(x)).
Therefore, whenever η ≤ πΨ(ψLRSE(x)) the maximizer of (18) is given by δ(x) =
ψLRSE(x) and the result is proved.
Proof of Theorem 6: Just as in Theorem 2 a Bayes rule δλ,η(x) maximizes
πΨ,λ(δ(x) |x)/max(η, πΨ,λ(δ(x))) for δ(x) ∈ Ψλ. Furthermore, as in Theorem
2, such a rule exists. Now define η(λ) so that 0 < η(λ) < ΠΨ(Bλ(ψLRSE(x))).
Note that η(λ)→ 0 as λ→ 0. We have that, as λ→ 0,
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)) |x)
max(η(λ), πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)))
=
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)) |x)
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)))
→
πΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)
πΨ(ψLRSE(x))
. (19)
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Let ǫ > 0. Let λ0 be such that supψ∈Ψdiam(Bλ(ψ)) < ǫ/2 for all λ < λ0.
Then for λ < λ0, and any δ(x) satisfying ||δ(x) − ψLRSE(x)|| ≥ ǫ, we have
πΨ,λ(ψλ(δ(x)) |x)
πΨ,λ(ψλ(δ(x)))
=
∫
Bλ(ψλ(δ(x)))
πΨ(ψ |x) νΨ(dψ)∫
Bλ(ψλ(δ(x)))
πΨ(ψ) νΨ(dψ)
=
∫
Bλ(ψλ(δ(x)))
πΨ(ψ | x)
πΨ(ψ)
πΨ(ψ) νΨ(dψ)∫
Bλ(ψλ(δ(x)))
πΨ(ψ) νΨ(dψ)
≤ sup
{ψ:||ψ−ψLRSE(x)||>ǫ/2}
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
<
πΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)
πΨ(ψLRSE(x))
. (20)
By (19) and (20) there exists λ1 < λ0 such that, for all λ < λ1,
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)) |x)
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)))
> sup
{ψ:||ψ−ψLRSE(x)||>ǫ/2}
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
. (21)
Therefore, when λ < λ1, a Bayes rule δλ,η(λ)(x) satisfies
πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x) |x)
πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x))
≥
πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x) |x)
max(η(λ), πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x)))
≥
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)) |x)
max(η(λ), πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)))
=
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)) |x)
πΨ,λ(ψλ(ψLRSE(x)))
. (22)
By (20), (21) and (22) this implies that ||δλ,η(λ) − ψLRSE(x)|| < ǫ and the
convergence is established.
Proof of Corollary 7: Following the proof of Theorem 6 we have that
πΨ,λ(ψˆλ(x) |x)/πΨ,λ(ψˆλ(x)) ≥ πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x) |x)/πΨ,λ(δλ,η(λ)(x)) and so by
(20), (21) and (22) this implies that ||ψˆλ(x) − ψLRSE(x)|| < ǫ and the con-
vergence of ψˆλ(x) to ψLRSE(x) is established.
Proof of Theorem 9: For c > 0 let Sc(x) = {πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ c} and
Sη,c(x) = {πΨ(ψ |x)/max(η, πΨ(ψ)) ≥ c}. Note that Sη,c(x) ↑ Sc(x) as η → 0.
Suppose c is such that ΠΨ(Sc(x) |x) ≤ γ. Then ΠΨ(Sη,c(x) |x) ≤ γ for all
η and so Sη,c(x) ⊂ Lη,γ(x). This implies that Sc(x) ⊂ lim infη→0 Lη,γ(x) and
since ΠΨ(Cγ(x) |x) = γ this implies that Cγ(x) ⊂ lim infη→0 Lη,γ(x).
Now suppose c is such that ΠΨ(Sc(x) |x) > γ. Then there exists η0 such
that for all η < η0 we have ΠΨ(Sη,c(x) |x) > γ. Since Lη,γ(x) ⊂ Sη,c(x) we have
that lim supη→0 Lη,γ(x) ⊂ Sc(x). Then choosing c = cγ′(x) for γ
′ > γ implies
that lim supη→0 Lη,γ(x) ⊂ Cγ′(x).
Proof of Theorem 10: Let Sc(x) = {ψ : πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ c} and Sλ,c(x) =
{ψ : ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x)/ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) ≥ c}. Recall that
lim
λ→0
ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x)/ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) = πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ)
for every ψ. If πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) > c, we have that there exists λ0 such that
for all λ < λ0, then ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x)/ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ)) > c and this implies that ψ ∈
17
lim infλ→0 Sλ,c(x). Now ΠΨ(πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) = c) = 0 and so we have Sc(x) ⊂
lim infλ→0 Sλ,c(x) (after possibly deleting a set of ΠΨ-measure 0 from Sc(x)).
Now, if ψ ∈ lim supλ→0 Sλ,c(x), then ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ) |x)/ΠΨ(Bλ(ψ))
≥ c for infinitely many λ → 0, which implies that πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ c, and
therefore ψ ∈ Sc(x). This proves Sc(x) = limλ→0 Sλ,c(x) (up to a set of ΠΨ-
measure 0) so that limλ→0 ΠΨ(Sλ,c(x)∆Sc(x) |x) = 0 for any c.
Let cλ,γ(x) = sup{c ≥ 0 : ΠΨ(Sλ,c(x) |x) ≥ γ} so Scγ(x)(x) = Cγ(x) and
Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x) = Cλ,γ(x). Then we have that
ΠΨ(Cγ(x)∆Cλ,γ (x) |x) = ΠΨ(Scγ(x)(x)∆Sλ,cλ,γ (x)(x) |x)
≤ ΠΨ(Scγ(x)(x)∆Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x) + ΠΨ(Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x)∆Sλ,cγ (x)(x) |x). (23)
Since Scγ(x)(x) = limλ→0 Sλ,cγ(x)(x) we have ΠΨ(Scγ(x)(x)∆Sλ,cγ (x)(x) |x)→ 0
and ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x)→ ΠΨ(Scγ(x)(x) |x) = γ as λ→ 0. Now consider the sec-
ond term in (23). Since πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) has a continuous posterior distribution,
we have ΠΨ(πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ) ≥ c |x) is continuous in c. Let ǫ > 0 and note that
for all λ small enough, ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ−ǫ(x)(x) |x) < γ and ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ+ǫ(x)(x) |x) > γ
which implies that cγ+ǫ(x) ≤ cλ,γ(x) ≤ cγ−ǫ(x) and therefore Sλ,cγ+ǫ(x)(x) ⊂
Sλ,cλ,γ(x) ⊂ Sλ,cγ−ǫ(x)(x). As Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x) ⊂ Sλ,cγ(x)(x) or Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x) ⊃
Sλ,cγ(x)(x) then
ΠΨ(Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x)∆Sλ,cγ (x)(x) |x) = |ΠΨ(Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x) |x) −ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x)|.
For all λ small |ΠΨ(Sλ,cλ,γ(x)(x) |x) −ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x)| is bounded above by
max{|ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ+ǫ(x)(x) |x) −ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x)|,
|ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ−ǫ(x)(x) |x) −ΠΨ(Sλ,cγ(x)(x) |x)|}
and this upper bound converges to ǫ as λ→ 0. Since ǫ is arbitrary we have that
the second term in (23) goes to 0 as λ→ 0 and this proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 11: Suppose, without loss of generality that 0 < γ < 1.
Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 satisfy γ + δ ≤ 1. Put γ′(λ, γ) = ΠΨ(Cλ,γ(x) |x), γ
′′(λ, γ)
= ΠΨ(Cγ+δ(x) |x) and note that γ
′(λ, γ) ≥ γ, γ′′(λ, γ) ≥ γ + δ. By Theorem
10 we have that Cλ,γ(x) → Cγ(x) and Cλ,γ+δ(x) → Cγ+δ(x) as λ → 0 so
γ′(λ, γ)→ γ and γ′′(λ, γ)→ γ + δ as λ→ 0. This implies that there is a λ0(δ)
such that for all λ < λ0(δ) then γ
′(λ, γ) < γ′′(λ, γ). Therefore, by Theorem 9,
we have that for all λ < λ0(δ)
Cλ,γ(x) ⊂ lim inf
η→0
Lη,λ,γ′(λ,γ)(x) ⊂ lim sup
η→0
Lη,λ,γ′(λ,γ)(x) ⊂ Cλ,γ+δ(x). (24)
From (24) and Theorem 10 we have that Cγ(x) ⊂ lim inf
λ→0
lim inf
η→0
Lη,λ,γ′(λ,γ)(x)
⊂ lim sup
λ→0
lim sup
η→0
Lη,λ,γ′(λ,γ)(x) ⊂ Cγ+δ(x). Since limδ→0 Cγ+δ(x) = Cγ(x) this
establishes the result.
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